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The Replication Crisis is Less of a “Crisis” in Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science

Rubin, Mark (2023) The Replication Crisis is Less of a “Crisis” in Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with Lakatos’ (1978) approach and a related approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutation, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, the NMF approach subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its approach of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that replication failures represent logical refutations of theories. In contrast, replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be legitimately ignored or used to motivate theory development.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Rubin, MarkMark-Rubin@outlook.com0000-0002-6483-8561
Keywords: metascience; Popper; Lakatos; replication crisis
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr Mark Rubin
Date Deposited: 23 Dec 2023 23:21
Last Modified: 23 Dec 2023 23:21
Item ID: 22890
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 22 December 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22890

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