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Theoretical Omniscience: Old Evidence or New Theory

C. R. Martins, André (2005) Theoretical Omniscience: Old Evidence or New Theory. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call theoretical omniscience (a stronger version of logical omniscience), a problem with non-commutativity of the learning theories follows. Therefore, scientists, when trying to behave as close to rationality as possible, should behave in a way close to the counterfactual strategy. The concept of theoretical omniscience will be applied to the problem of Jeffrey conditionalization, as an example, and we will see that a more complete theoretical model can provide a classical conditionalization where you can learn that data was wrong and all you will not unlearn is your memory.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Theoretical Omniscience, Rationality, Jeffrey Conditionalization
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: André Cavalcanti Rocha Martins
    Date Deposited: 30 Sep 2005
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
    Item ID: 2458
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2458

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