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Informational Realism

Floridi, Luciano (2005) Informational Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

What is the ultimate nature of reality? This paper defends an answer in terms of informational realism (IR). It does so in three stages. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable by using the methodology of the levels of abstractions. It follows that OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that OSR is also plausible, because not all related objects are logically prior to all relational structures. The relation of difference is at least as fundamental as (because constitutive of) any relata. Third, it is suggested that an ontology of structural objects for OSR can reasonably be developed in terms of informational objects, and that Object Oriented Programming provides a flexible and powerful methodology with which to clarify and make precise the concept of “informational object”. The outcome is informational realism, the view that the world is the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other.


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Item Type: Preprint
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Floridi, Luciano
Additional Information: published in ACS Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology (CRPIT), 2004, (3), pp. 7-12.
Keywords: Structural realism, epistemic structural realism, ontic structural realism, levels of abstraction, informational ontology, object oriented programming
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computation/Information > Classical
Depositing User: Luciano Floridi
Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2005
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID: 2538
Public Domain: No
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computation/Information > Classical
Date: January 2005
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2538

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