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Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence

Forster, Malcolm R. (2006) Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
    Keywords: The likelihood principle, the law of likelihood, evidence, Bayesianism, Likelihoodism, curve fitting, regression, asymmetry of cause and effect
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Philosophers of Science
    Depositing User: Malcolm R. Forster
    Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 2855
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2855

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