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Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence

Forster, Malcolm R. (2006) Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Forster, Malcolm R.
Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
Keywords: The likelihood principle, the law of likelihood, evidence, Bayesianism, Likelihoodism, curve fitting, regression, asymmetry of cause and effect
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Malcolm R. Forster
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 2855
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2855

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