Forster, Malcolm R. (2006) Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. | ||||||
| Keywords: | The likelihood principle, the law of likelihood, evidence, Bayesianism, Likelihoodism, curve fitting, regression, asymmetry of cause and effect | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Malcolm R. Forster | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 11 Sep 2006 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:14 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 2855 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | September 2006 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2855 |
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