Millstein, Roberta L. (2001) Are Random Drift and Natural Selection Conceptually Distinct? [Preprint]
Abstract
The latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by debates in evolutionary biology over the relative significance of natural selection and random drift: the so-called �neutralist/selectionist� debates. Yet John Beatty has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept of natural selection, a claim that has been accepted by many philosophers of biology. If this claim is correct, then the neutralist/selectionist debates seem at best futile, and at worst, meaningless. I reexamine the issues that Beatty raises, and argue that random drift and natural selection, conceived as processes, can be distinguished from one another.
| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | Beatty, Brandon, Carson, Hodge, causal relevance, chance, conceptual distinction, discriminate sampling, evolution, indiscriminate sampling, natural selection, neutralism, outcome, probability, process, random drift, selectionism, evolution. |
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| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Roberta L. Millstein |
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| Date Deposited: | 24 Jul 2001 |
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| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:10 |
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| Item ID: | 334 |
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| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/334 |
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