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Causation With a Human Face

Woodward, James (2007) Causation With a Human Face. In: [2008] Causation Workshop (Pittsburgh, PA; January 26, 2008).

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    Abstract

    What is the relationship between, on the one hand, the sorts of causal claims found in the special sciences (and in common sense) and, on the other hand, the world as described by physics? A standard picture goes like this: the fundamental laws of physics are causal laws in the sense that they can be interpreted as telling us that realizations of one set of physical factors or properties “causes” realizations of other properties. Causal claims in the special sciences are then true (to the extent that they are) in virtue of “instantiating” these underlying causal laws; as it is often put, the latter serve as “truth-makers” for the former. The picture is thus one according to which the notion of cause, as it occurs in the special sciences, is reflected or “grounded” in a fairly straightforward and transparent way in a similar notion that occurs in fundamental physics. This paper explores some alternatives to this picture


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: causation, interventionism
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Causation Workshop (Pittsburgh, PA; January 26, 2008)
    Depositing User: Jim Woodward
    Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3844
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3844

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