Frost-Arnold, Greg (2008) The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument. In:  Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers.
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There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and fails to unify disparate phenomena. Third, Psillos, Boyd, and other proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||realism, antirealism, inference to the best explanation, naturalism|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Explanation|
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
|Conferences and Volumes:|| Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers|
|Depositing User:||Greg Frost-Arnold|
|Date Deposited:||31 Oct 2008|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:17|
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