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The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument

Frost-Arnold, Greg (2008) The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument. In: [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and fails to unify disparate phenomena. Third, Psillos, Boyd, and other proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: realism, antirealism, inference to the best explanation, naturalism
    Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Greg Frost-Arnold
    Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:17
    Item ID: 4268
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4268

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