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Cosmology and Inductive Inference: A Bayesian Failure

Norton, John D. (2009) Cosmology and Inductive Inference: A Bayesian Failure. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    A probabilistic logic of induction is unable to separate cleanly neutral support from disfavoring evidence (or ignorance from disbelief). Thus, the use of probabilistic representations may introduce spurious results stemming from its expressive inadequacy. That such spurious results arise in the Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown by a reanalysis that employs fragments of an inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Further, the improper introduction of inductive probabilities is illustrated with the “self-sampling assumption.”


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: For updates, see http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton
    Keywords: confirmation induction probability Bayesianism cosmology Doomsday self-sampling multiverse
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
    Depositing User: John Norton
    Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2009
    Last Modified: 12 May 2012 09:11
    Item ID: 4866
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4866

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