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Cosmology and Inductive Inference: A Bayesian Failure

Norton, John D. (2009) Cosmology and Inductive Inference: A Bayesian Failure. [Preprint]

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Abstract

A probabilistic logic of induction is unable to separate cleanly neutral support from disfavoring evidence (or ignorance from disbelief). Thus, the use of probabilistic representations may introduce spurious results stemming from its expressive inadequacy. That such spurious results arise in the Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown by a reanalysis that employs fragments of an inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Further, the improper introduction of inductive probabilities is illustrated with the “self-sampling assumption.”


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Norton, John D.
Additional Information: For updates, see http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton
Keywords: confirmation induction probability Bayesianism cosmology Doomsday self-sampling multiverse
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
Depositing User: John Norton
Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2009
Last Modified: 12 May 2012 13:11
Item ID: 4866
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4866

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