Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions.
According to one argument for the anti-doxastic conception of delusions, delusions are not beliefs because they are not responsive to evidence and responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In this paper, I concede that delusions are not responsive to evidence, but I challenge the other premise of this anti-doxastic argument, namely, that responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In order to undermine the premise, I describe instances of non-pathological beliefs that strenuously resist counterevidence. I conclude that considerations about responsiveness to evidence do not necessarily lead us to deny that delusions are beliefs. On the contrary, they seem to support the view that there is continuity between delusions and non-pathological beliefs.
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