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Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions

Bortolotti, Lisa (2009) Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions. In: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    According to one argument for the anti-doxastic conception of delusions, delusions are not beliefs because they are not responsive to evidence and responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In this paper, I concede that delusions are not responsive to evidence, but I challenge the other premise of this anti-doxastic argument, namely, that responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In order to undermine the premise, I describe instances of non-pathological beliefs that strenuously resist counterevidence. I conclude that considerations about responsiveness to evidence do not necessarily lead us to deny that delusions are beliefs. On the contrary, they seem to support the view that there is continuity between delusions and non-pathological beliefs.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: epistemic rationality, belief, delusions, evidence
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Lisa Bortolotti
    Date Deposited: 02 Apr 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
    Item ID: 5270
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5270

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