Elliott, Kevin (2011) Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Elliott, Kevin
Keywords:	inductive risk; epistemic attitudes; standards of evidence; indirect role for values; value free ideal
Subjects:	General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science General Issues > Science and Policy
Depositing User:	Kevin Elliott
Date Deposited:	27 Aug 2010
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:20
Item ID:	5522
Subjects:	General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science General Issues > Science and Policy
Date:	January 2011
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5522

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