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On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design

Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not testable and (ii) one cannot confirm a theory by criticizing a competing one absent further assumptions about their relation. Elliott Sober has developed these claims within likelihoodism, which defines the testability and confirmation of a theory only in contrast to another, and has argued that the claims hold for intelligent design (ID) when contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET). I show that Sober’s arguments rely on a contentious hidden premise, and that within likelihoodism, both claims are false for ID and ET under his assumptions and one very weak further assumption about ID and ET. I then show that, given Sober’s assumptions, the claims are true for a non-contrastive criterion of testability close to the Bayesian one and the relevance criterion of confirmation.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: To be presented at the APA Eastern Division Meeting, Washington, DC, December 27th–30th 2011
    Keywords: likelihoodism; Bayesianism; testability; confirmation; empirical significance; intelligent design
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
    General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
    Date Deposited: 15 May 2011 11:45
    Last Modified: 15 May 2011 11:45
    Item ID: 8608
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8608

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