Wayne, Andrew (2012) Causal relations and explanatory strategies in physics. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide range of explanations (including explanations in physics) are causal, based on his interventionist approach to causation. This article focuses on explanations, widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. I argue that causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and others maintain.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Wayne, Andrew awayne@uoguelph.ca
Keywords:	explanation; causation; physics; models; idealization
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User:	Andrew Wayne
Date Deposited:	21 Jun 2012 10:32
Last Modified:	21 Jun 2012 10:32
Item ID:	9179
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Physics
Date:	20 June 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9179

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