Zilhão, António (2012) Moore's Problem. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of (1) and (2):

(1) It is raining but I believe it is not raining
(2) It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining

strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions are the blindspots of belief. According to either, Moore-propositions are unbelievable. I argue that Moore-propositions are actually believable.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Zilhão, António AntonioZilhao@fl.ul.pt
Keywords:	Criteria of Doxastic Admissibility, Desiderata of Belief Formation, Logical Paradoxes, Rationality
Subjects:	General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User:	António Zilhão
Date Deposited:	15 Jul 2012 00:27
Last Modified:	23 Jul 2019 12:32
Item ID:	9229
Subjects:	General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date:	14 June 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9229

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