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Theory choice, good sense and social consensus

Ivanova, Milena and Paternotte, Cedric (2012) Theory choice, good sense and social consensus. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem's notion of 'good sense'. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ivanova, Milenamilena.ivanova@bristol.ac.uk
Paternotte, CedricCedric Paternotte <cedric.paternotte@bristol.ac.uk>
Keywords: Social Choice, Pierre Duhem, Good Sense, Theory Choice, Underdetermination
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Dr Milena Ivanova
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2012 17:54
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2012 17:54
Item ID: 9312
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 2012
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9312

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