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The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument

Lewis, Peter J. (2012) The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    The Simulation Argument and the Doomsday Argument share certain structural similarities, and hence are often discussed together (Bostrom 2003, Aranyosi 2004, Richmond 2008, Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011). Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in one case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do share strong structural similarities. But there are also some disanalogies between the two arguments, and I argue that these disanalogies mean that the Simulation Argument succeeds and the Doomsday Argument fails.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Doomsday argument, simulation argument, self-location, centered credence
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Peter J. Lewis
    Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2012 13:38
    Last Modified: 17 Jan 2013 14:07
    Item ID: 9386
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9386

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