Benedictus, F. J. and Dieks, Dennis (2013) Reichenbach’s Transcendental Probability. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the Neo-Kantian justification for the
application of probabilistic concepts in physics that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career,
notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this Kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with
Reichenbach’s later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall
attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach’s thought: typical features of his
early Kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Reichenbach, probability, induction, neo-kantianism | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. F. J. Benedictus | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jun 2013 15:47 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2013 15:47 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 9837 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Date: | 2013 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9837 |
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