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Propensities and Pragmatism

Suárez, Mauricio (2011) Propensities and Pragmatism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Abstract (for The Review of Metaphysics): This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities (under a suitable interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms). The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I urge a return to Charles Peirce’s original insights on probabilistic dispositions, and offer a reconstructed version of his pragmatist conception, which rejects the identity thesis. – Correspondence to: msuarez@filos.ucm.es


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Suárez, Mauriciomsuarez@filos.ucm.es
Additional Information: Appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. CX, No. 2, February 2013, pp. 61-92.
Keywords: propensities, probability, pragmatism, Charles Peirce, Karl Popper
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Mauricio Suárez
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2013 16:34
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2013 16:34
Item ID: 9990
Official URL: http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/index....
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 18 December 2011
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9990

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