POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS AND AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001) POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS AND AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM.
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Abstract
In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE),
a conception of natural science that I have defended at some
length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of
Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism
protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science
from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.
| Keywords: | Popper Kuhn Lakatos scientific method scientific rationality falsificationism paradigm revolution progress metaphysics research programme knowledge |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | General Issues: Confirmation/Induction General Issues: Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences: Physics General Issues: Structure of Theories General Issues: Theory Change |
| ID Code: | 251 |
| Deposited By: | Maxwell, Nicholas |
| Deposited On: | 29 April 2001 |
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