Monton, Bradley (2001) Presentism and Quantum Gravity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Monton, Bradley
Keywords:	presentism, quantum gravity
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User:	Bradley Monton
Date Deposited:	26 Mar 2002
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:10
Item ID:	591
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date:	August 2001
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/591

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• Presentism and Quantum Gravity. (deposited 26 Mar 2002) [Currently Displayed]
  • Presentism and Quantum Gravity. (deposited 19 May 2005)

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