Presentism and Quantum Gravity
Monton, Bradley (2001) Presentism and Quantum Gravity.
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Abstract
There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.
| Keywords: | presentism, quantum gravity |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences: Physics: Cosmology Specific Sciences: Physics: Relativity Theory |
| ID Code: | 591 |
| Deposited By: | Monton, Bradley |
| Deposited On: | 26 March 2002 |
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