Norton, John D. (2002) On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument? [Preprint]
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Abstract
Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my co-symposiasts.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | thought experiment empiricism Platonism | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Depositing User: | John Norton | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 09 Aug 2002 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 15 Jun 2016 20:23 | ||||||
Item ID: | 719 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Date: | August 2002 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/719 |
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