Darling, Karen Merikangas (2002) Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem`s philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem`s philosophy.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Darling, Karen Merikangas
Keywords:	Realism/Anti-Realism, Philosophers of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, General Philosophy of Science
Depositing User:	Program Committee
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1061
Date:	2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1061

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