Representing Causation

Wolff, Phillip (2007) Representing Causation. In [2007] Workshop: Causality, Mechanisms, and Psychology (Pittsburgh, PA; 24 February, 2007).

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Abstract

The dynamics model, which is based on Talmy’s (1988) theory of force dynamics, characterizes
causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and
probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related
concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for
the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3D animations of
realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors
entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1-3 showed that causal judgments are based on
several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of
forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach
extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between
causation and time are discussed.

Keywords:causation, causal models, causal learning, knowledge structures, lexical semantics
Subjects:General Issues: Causation
Conferences and Volumes:[2007] Workshop: Causality, Mechanisms, and Psychology (Pittsburgh, PA; 24 February, 2007)
ID Code:3126
Deposited By:Sytsma, Justin
Deposited On:05 January 2007
Additional Information:Causal Representation (in press). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. To appear February 2007.