Schupbach, Jonah N. (2007) On the Alleged Impossibility of Bayesian Coherentism. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF PhilSciArchiveCoherence.pdf Download (490kB)

Abstract

The success of Bovens and Hartmann’s recent "impossibility result" against Bayesian Coherentism relies upon the adoption of a specific set of ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, I argue that these conditions are not clearly appropriate; certain proposed coherence measures motivate different such conditions and also call for the rejection of at least one of Bovens and Hartmann's conditions. I show that there exist sets of intuitively plausible ceteris paribus conditions that allow one to sidestep the impossibility result. This shifts the debate from the merits of the impossibility result itself to the underlying choice of ceteris paribus conditions.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Schupbach, Jonah N.
Keywords:	Bayesian Coherentism, coherence, coherence measures, Bayesianism, impossibility result
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Jonah N. Schupbach
Date Deposited:	02 Jul 2007
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:15
Item ID:	3408
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	June 2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3408

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item