Brigandt, Ingo (2009) Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. [Preprint]

PDF Scientific_reasoning_is_material_inference.pdf Download (107kB)

Abstract

Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premisses and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains why these different aspects (including discovery) can be rational without conforming to formal schemes, and why scientific reasoning is local, i.e., justified only in certain domains and contingent on particular empirical facts. The notion of material inference also fruitfully interacts with accounts of conceptual change and psychological theories of concepts.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Brigandt, Ingo
Additional Information:	Draft of a paper forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	inference, concepts, confirmation, induction, explanation, discovery, conceptual change
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User:	Ingo Brigandt
Date Deposited:	18 Aug 2009
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:18
Item ID:	4838
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Explanation
Date:	August 2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4838

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item