Norton, John D. (2009) A Material Solution to the Problem of Induction. [Preprint]
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Abstract
In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that Hume’s celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Induction problem material Hume | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Depositing User: | John Norton | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 01 Sep 2009 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:18 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 4865 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Date: | August 2009 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4865 |
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