Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I argue that advocates of the Doomsday Argument are faced with a dilemma. If they accept the thirder position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank has no effect on one’s credences concerning the survival of the human species. If they accept the halfer position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank may confirm smaller total human populations over larger ones, but this is not equivalent to confirmation of a shorter future for humanity, and in fact the same evidence may confirm longer future human survival over shorter.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lewis, Peter J.
Keywords:	Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location.
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Peter J. Lewis
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2009
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:18
Item ID:	4885
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	August 2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4885

Available Versions of this Item

• A note on the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 14 Jul 2009)
  • A note on the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 13 Sep 2009) [Currently Displayed]

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