Otsuka, Jun (2018) Species as models. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper argues that biological species should be construed as abstract models, rather than biological or even tangible entities. Various (phenetic, cladistic, biological etc.) species concepts are defined as set-theoretic models of formal theories, and their logical connections are illustrated. In this view organisms relate to a species not as instantiations, members, or mereological parts, but rather as phenomena to be represented by the model/species. This sheds new light on the long-standing problems of species and suggests their connection to broader philosophical topics such as model selection, scientific representation, and scientific realism.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Otsuka, Jun junotk@gmail.com 0000-0003-4774-9740
Keywords:	Biological species, models, scientific representation
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Biology > Systematics General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Jun Otsuka
Date Deposited:	17 Oct 2018 19:34
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2018 19:34
Item ID:	15162
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Biology > Systematics General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	31 March 2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15162

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