Park, Seungbae (2018) The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.

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Abstract

In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Park, Seungbae
Keywords:	Anti-Induction, No-Miracles Argument, Pessimistic Induction, Scientific Realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited:	23 Jan 2019 15:29
Last Modified:	23 Jan 2019 15:29
Item ID:	15636
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15636

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