Heylen, Jan (2010) Descriptions and Unknowability. Analysis, 70 (1). pp. 50-52.

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Abstract

In a recent paper Horsten embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability that is not relativized to a formal system. He presented an argument for the conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property. The argument depends on a description principle. I will argue that the latter principle implies the knowability of all arithmetical truths. Therefore, Horsten's argument is either sound but its conclusion is trivial, or his argument is unsound.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Heylen, Jan jan.heylen@kuleuven.be 0000-0002-2809-3320
Keywords:	A priori knowability of mathematical truths; Descriptions; Collapse argument
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Depositing User:	Dr. Jan Heylen
Date Deposited:	20 Dec 2019 17:29
Last Modified:	20 Dec 2019 17:29
Item ID:	16736
Journal or Publication Title:	Analysis
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1093/analys/anp133
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Date:	2010
Page Range:	pp. 50-52
Volume:	70
Number:	1
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16736

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