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Items where Author is "Climenhaga, Nevin"

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Number of items: 7.

Preprint

Climenhaga, Nevin and DesAutels, Lane and Ramsey, Grant (2019) Causal Inference from Noise. [Preprint]

Climenhaga, Nevin (2013) A Problem For the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation. [Preprint]

Published Article or Volume

Climenhaga, Nevin (2023) Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Climenhaga, Nevin (2020) Evidence and Inductive Inference. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn.

Climenhaga, Nevin (2019) The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities. Philosophical Studies. pp. 1-30. ISSN 0031-8116

Climenhaga, Nevin (2017) Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent. Journal of Philosophy.

Climenhaga, Nevin (2016) How Explanation Guides Confirmation. Philosophy of Science.

This list was generated on Sun Jul 21 21:55:15 2024 EDT.