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A chance for attributable agency

Briegel, Hans and Müller, Thomas (2014) A chance for attributable agency. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Can we sensibly attribute some of the happenings in our world to the agency of some of the things around us? We do this all the time, but there are conceptual challenges purporting to show that attributable agency, and specifically one of its most important subspecies, human free agency, is incoherent. We address these challenges in a novel way: Rather than merely rebutting specific arguments, we discuss a concrete model that we claim positively illustrates attributable agency in an indeterministic setting. The model, recently introduced by one of the authors in the context of artificial intelligence, shows that an agent with a sufficiently complex memory organization can employ indeterministic happenings in a meaningful way. We claim that these considerations successfully counter arguments against the coherence of libertarian (indeterminism-based) free will.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Briegel, Hanshans.briegel@uibk.ac.at
Müller, ThomasThomas.Mueller@uni-konstanz.de
Keywords: agency, attribution, indeterminism, libertarianism, projective simulation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User: Dr. Thomas Müller
Date Deposited: 24 Feb 2014 14:03
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2014 14:03
Item ID: 10349
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date: 24 February 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10349

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