Rossberg, Marcus and Cohnitz, Daniel
(2009)
Logical Consequence for Nominalists.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24 (2).
pp. 147-168.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine’s which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
Philosophy of mathematics, nominalism, logical consequence, inferentialism, Nelson Goodman, W.V. Quine |
Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
Date Deposited: |
24 Feb 2014 22:46 |
Last Modified: |
24 Feb 2014 22:46 |
Item ID: |
10364 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.440 |
Date: |
May 2009 |
Page Range: |
pp. 147-168 |
Volume: |
24 |
Number: |
2 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10364 |
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