Verdejo, Víctor M.
(2009)
Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either).
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24 (1).
pp. 29-47.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
inferential Role Semantics, compositionality, rationality, semantic rule, reverse compositionality |
Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
Date Deposited: |
28 Feb 2014 00:05 |
Last Modified: |
28 Feb 2014 00:05 |
Item ID: |
10377 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.382 |
Date: |
November 2009 |
Page Range: |
pp. 29-47 |
Volume: |
24 |
Number: |
1 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10377 |
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