PhilSci Archive

Trusting others. The epistemological authority of testimony

Broncano, Fernando (2008) Trusting others. The epistemological authority of testimony. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (1). pp. 11-22. ISSN 2171-679X

[img]
Preview
PDF
2-618-1-PB.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (306kB)

Abstract

I propose to consider the interpersonal character of testimony as a kind of social bond created by the mutual intention of sharing knowledge. The paper explores the social mechanism that supports this mutual intention starting from an initial situation of modelling the other’s epistemic perspective. Accepting testimony as a joint action creates epistemic duties and responsibilities and the eventual success can be considered as a genuine achievement at the social level of epistemology. Trust is presented here as the symptom that both parties are involved in such a social bond.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Broncano, Fernandofernando.broncano@uc3m.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: testimony, social epistemology, joint actions, trust
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2014 00:33
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2014 00:33
Item ID: 10401
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.2
Date: November 2008
Page Range: pp. 11-22
Volume: 23
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10401

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item