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Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

Prades, Josep L (2007) Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22 (1). pp. 25-33. ISSN 2171-679X

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In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional action presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An endorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions be-hind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Prades, Josep
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: intentional action, self-knowledge, reasons, practical reasoning
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2014 20:10
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 21:59
Item ID: 10434
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.479
Date: 2007
Page Range: pp. 25-33
Volume: 22
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X

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