López de Sa, Dan (2006) The Case against Evaluative Realism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (3). pp. 277-294. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID López de Sa, Dan dlds@st-andrews.ac.uk
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	evaluative realism, flexibility, metaethics, internalism, causal efficacy
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	06 Mar 2014 20:23
Last Modified:	06 Mar 2014 20:23
Item ID:	10446
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.521
Date:	September 2006
Page Range:	pp. 277-294
Volume:	21
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10446

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