Sayward, Charles (2005) Steiner versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 20 (3). pp. 347-352. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sayward, Charles csayward@unlserve.unl.edu
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	Mark Steiner, Gödel, Wittgenstein, Juliet Floyd, realism, mathematical truth, provability
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2014 17:35
Last Modified:	11 Mar 2014 17:35
Item ID:	10475
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.567
Date:	September 2005
Page Range:	pp. 347-352
Volume:	20
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10475

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