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Normativity and its vindication: The case of Logic

Martínez Vidal, Concha (2004) Normativity and its vindication: The case of Logic. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19 (2). pp. 191-206. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Physical laws are irresistible. Logical rules are not. That is why logic is said to be normative. Given a system of logic we have a Norma, a standard of correctness. The problem is that we need another Norma to establish when the standard of correctness is to be applied. Subsequently we start by clarifying the senses in which the term ‘logic’ and the term ‘normativity’ are being used. Then we explore two different epistemo-logies for logic to see the sort of defence of the normativity of logic they allow for; if any. The analysis concentrates on the case of classical logic. In particular the issue will be appraised from the perspective put forward by the epistemology based on the methodology of wide reflective equilibrium and the scientific one underlying the view of logic as model.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Martínez Vidal, Conchalflpcmav@usc.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: normativity, logic, wide reflective equilibrium, view of logic as model
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 18:08
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 18:08
Item ID: 10505
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.594
Date: May 2004
Page Range: pp. 191-206
Volume: 19
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10505

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