Pineda, David
(2003)
Synchronous Events in By-Sentences.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 18 (3).
pp. 351-357.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
It has been suggested in the literature about actions than one can honour the philosophical intuition lying behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentences used to report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) without accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as referring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with two plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acceptable. My conclusion is then that in order to deny the Anscombe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s
intuition is wrong.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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| Creators: |
|
| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
Metaphysics of action, ontology of events, Anscombe thesis |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
11 Mar 2014 18:23 |
| Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 21:10 |
| Item ID: |
10523 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.433 |
| Date: |
2003 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 351-357 |
| Volume: |
18 |
| Number: |
3 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10523 |
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