Brigandt, Ingo (2002) Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Brigandt, Ingo
Keywords:	Biology, Systematics, Species, Conceptual Change, Natural Kinds
Depositing User:	Program Committee
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1055
Date:	2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1055

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