Mizrahi, Moti (2014) Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is ambiguous between two interpretations: CE as a normative epistemology of science and CE as a descriptive philosophy of science. When they present CE, constructive empiricists write as if CE is supposed to be more than a normative epistemology of science and that it is meant to be responsible to actual scientific practices. However, when they respond to objections, constructive empiricists fall back on a strictly normative interpretation of CE. This ambiguity seems to make CE immune to objections in a rather ad hoc fashion.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Keywords:	Bas van Fraassen; constructive empiricism; inference to the best explanation; observable; scientific realism; voluntarist epistemology
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	08 Mar 2014 13:36
Last Modified:	08 Mar 2014 13:36
Item ID:	10554
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	7 March 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10554

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