Kaiserman, Alex (2014) Normative Causation. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Both everyday and scientific causal judgements seem to be sensitive to normative features of cases. This paper defends a revision to the counterfactual account of causation that builds normativity into the truth conditions of causal claims. I defend this conclusion by an inference to the best explanation, raising problems with rival explanations appealing to pragmatics or ambiguity and highlighting the theoretical and genealogical motivations for my alternative.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kaiserman, Alex alexander.kaiserman@jesus.ox.ac.uk
Additional Information:	Document removed at the request of the author.
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation
Depositing User:	Mr Alex Kaiserman
Date Deposited:	25 Mar 2014 20:57
Last Modified:	16 Aug 2014 17:05
Item ID:	10565
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation
Date:	March 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10565

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