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Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences?

Nagatsu, Michiru (2014) Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences? In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

People do not behave strictly so as to maximize monetary payoffs in ex- perimental games such as Public Goods and Ultimatum games. To explain this ‘anomaly’, behavioural economists have proposed so-called social pref- erence models that try to capture other-regarding preferences (altruism, in- equity aversion, reciprocity, etc.) as additional arguments of players’ util- ity functions. However, none of the proposed model has successfully ex- plained data across different games. I give a proper diagnosis to this situa- tion by examining Woodward’s (2008) methodological critique of the social preference approach. I argue that the problem lies not in external validity as Woodward argues, but internal validity of those experiments. Specifically, I defend the one-shot design as a useful paradigm as long as it is internally valid.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Nagatsu, Michirumichiru.nagatsu@helsinki.fi
Additional Information: Document removed at the request of the author.
Keywords: Internal validity, external validity, extrapolation, behavioral economics, experiments
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User: Dr Michiru Nagatsu
Date Deposited: 24 Mar 2014 18:12
Last Modified: 12 Jun 2014 15:58
Item ID: 10576
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Experimentation
Date: 24 March 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10576

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