Elgin, Mehmet (2002) Biology and A Priori Laws. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, my main objective is to investigate the nature of a priori biological laws in connection with the idea that laws must be empirical. I argue that functions of so-called a priori biological laws in biological sciences are the same as those of empirical physical laws. Thus, the requirement of being empirical makes no difference how laws operate in sciences. This result presents us a choice between sticking with a philosophical requirement of laws being empirical or taking functional equivalences of laws seriously and modify our philosophical accounts of laws. I favor the latter. The paper consists of 4 sections. In section 1, I define the problem and I briefly explain my strategy in addressing it. In section 2, I discuss the relation between explanation and laws. In section 3, I compare a priori biological laws with some physical laws and I argue that their functions are the same in sciences to which they belong. In section 4, I discuss the implications of my discussions in sections 2 and 3 and I argue that the requirement of empirical is too strong.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Elgin, Mehmet
Keywords:	Laws of Nature, Biology, A Priori Laws, Explanation, The Requirement of Being Empirical
Depositing User:	Program Committee
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1064
Date:	2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1064

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