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Causation and the Agent’s Point of View

Álvarez Toledo, Sebastián (2014) Causation and the Agent’s Point of View. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29 (1). pp. 133-147. ISSN 2171-679X

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There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective which can account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Álvarez Toledo, Sebastiá
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Causation; manipulability; agent’s perspective; Huw Price
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email
Date Deposited: 06 May 2014 11:29
Last Modified: 06 May 2014 11:29
Item ID: 10656
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.6952
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: January 2014
Page Range: pp. 133-147
Volume: 29
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X

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