Parke, Emily C. (2014) Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations. Two ideas underpin this belief: First, experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and second, simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can. In this paper I argue that neither of these claims is true of experiments versus simulations in general. We should give up the common practice of resting in-principle judgments about the epistemic value of cases of scientific inquiry on whether we classify those cases as experiments or simulations, per se. To the extent that either methodology puts researchers in a privileged epistemic position, this is context-sensitive.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | experiment, simulation, modeling, materiality, epistemic value, experimental evolution, surprise | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Depositing User: | Emily Parke | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 07 Jun 2014 21:58 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Mar 2015 14:03 | ||||||
Item ID: | 10725 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Date: | 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10725 |
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Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege. (deposited 05 Jun 2014 10:32)
- Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege. (deposited 07 Jun 2014 21:58) [Currently Displayed]
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