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Evidence for causal mechanisms in social science: recommendations from Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation

Runhardt, Rosa W (2014) Evidence for causal mechanisms in social science: recommendations from Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In a backlash against the prevalence of statistical methods, recently social scientists have focused more on studying causal mechanisms. They increasingly rely on a technique called process-tracing, which involves contrasting the observable implications of several alternative mechanisms. Problematically, process-tracers do not commit to a fundamental notion of causation, and therefore arguably they cannot discern between mere correlation between the links of their purported mechanisms and genuine causation. In this paper, I argue that committing to Woodward's interventionist notion of causation would solve this problem: process-tracers should take into account evidence for possible interventions on the mechanisms they study.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Runhardt, Rosa Wr.w.runhardt@lse.ac.uk
Keywords: causation causal mechanisms James Woodward manipulability theory philosophy of social science
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: Rosa W. Runhardt
Date Deposited: 24 Jun 2014 14:55
Last Modified: 24 Jun 2014 14:55
Item ID: 10775
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: June 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10775

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