Rosenblatt, Lucas
(2014)
The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29 (2).
pp. 201-221.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of using the truth predicate to emulate other modal notions. It turns out that this idea works quite well.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
Knowability Argument; Type-theoretic approach; Self-reference; Multimodal paradoxes; Truth |
Depositing User: |
Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
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Date Deposited: |
15 Jul 2014 12:17 |
Last Modified: |
15 Jul 2014 12:17 |
Item ID: |
10864 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.7225 |
Date: |
1 May 2014 |
Page Range: |
pp. 201-221 |
Volume: |
29 |
Number: |
2 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10864 |
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