Elga, Adam (2014) Bayesian humility. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Say that an agent is "epistemically humble" if she is less than certain that her opinions will converge to the truth, given an appropriate stream of evidence. Is such humility rationally permissible? According to the orgulity argument (Belot 2013): the answer is "yes" but long-run convergence-to-the-truth theorems force Bayesians to answer "no." That argument has no force against Bayesians who reject countable additivity as a requirement of rationality. Such Bayesians are free to count even extreme humility as rationally permissible.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Elga, Adam adame@princeton.edu
Keywords:	Bayesianism, orgulity, convergence to the truth, convergence theorem, washing out, finite additivity, finitely additive probability, countable additivity, problem of priors
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Adam Elga
Date Deposited:	18 Aug 2014 19:06
Last Modified:	02 Sep 2014 14:49
Item ID:	10963
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	17 July 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10963

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• Bayesian humility. (deposited 18 Aug 2014 19:06) [Currently Displayed]
  • Bayesian humility. (deposited 02 Sep 2014 14:49)
    • Bayesian humility. (deposited 27 Sep 2015 16:42)
      • Bayesian humility. (deposited 29 Jun 2016 00:41)

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